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Abstract
Background: Resuscitation and treatment of critically ill newborn infants is associated with relatively high mortality,
morbidity and cost. Guidelines relating to resuscitation have traditionally focused on the best interests of infants.
There are, however, limited resources available in the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU), meaning that difficult
decisions sometimes need to be made. This study explores the intuitions of lay people (non-health professionals)
regarding resource allocation decisions in the NICU.
Methods: The study design was a cross-sectional quantitative survey, consisting of 20 hypothetical rationing
scenarios. There were 119 respondents who entered the questionnaire, and 109 who completed it. The
respondents were adult US and Indian participants of the online crowdsourcing platform Mechanical Turk.
Respondents were asked to decide which of two infants to treat in a situation of scarce resources. Demographic
characteristics, personality traits and political views were recorded. Respondents were also asked to respond to a
widely cited thought experiment involving rationing.
Results: The majority of respondents, in all except one scenario, chose the utilitarian option of directing treatment
to the infant with the higher chance of survival, higher life expectancy, less severe disability, and less expensive
treatment. As discrepancy between outcomes decreased, however, there was a statistically significant increase in
egalitarian responses and decrease in utilitarian responses in scenarios involving chance of survival (P = 0.001), life
expectancy (P = 0.0001), and cost of treatment (P = 0.01). In the classic ‘lifeboat’ scenario, all but two respondents
were utilitarian.
Conclusions: This survey suggests that in situations of scarcity and equal clinical need, non-health professionals
support rationing of life-saving treatment based on probability of survival, duration of survival, cost of treatment or
quality of life. However, where the difference in prognosis or cost is very small, non-health professionals preferred
to give infants an equal chance of receiving treatment.
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Background
Advances in medical technology enable doctors to save
the lives of newborn infants who would have previously
died [1, 2]. Some of these infants have a low chance of
survival with treatment, or may survive with significant
morbidity and shortened life expectancy [3]. Guidelines
relating to provision of intensive care for critically ill
newborns have traditionally focused on the best interests
of infants [4]. However, there are limited resources
(including staff, equipment and physical space) available
within neonatal intensive care units (NICU) [5], meaning
that sometimes treatment that would be in the best
interests of an infant is not available. In developed
countries there may be ways of stretching existing
resources, though these have impacts on the quality of
care and outcome [6, 7]. Neonates may require transfer
to other hospitals to receive treatment [5], with an asso-
ciated increase in morbidity and mortality [8, 9]. In
countries with limited intensive care facilities and trans-
port options, infants who are unable to receive
treatment die [10, 11]. Where multiple infants require
treatment, difficult decisions need to be made about
which infant to treat [12]. How should doctors allocate
limited resources and decide which patients to treat?
In answering this question, moral philosophers have
described ethical principles of distributive justice including
utilitarianism, egalitarianism and prioritarianism. In the
context of resource allocation, utilitarianism focuses on
maximizing aggregate population health by directing
treatment to patients with the best prognosis [13]. Cost-
Effectiveness Analysis (CEA), QALYs and DALYs are oper-
ationalized versions of this [12]. Egalitarianism recognizes
the importance of equal opportunity for equal need. It is
the stated basis of the UK National Health Service [14].
Resource allocation approaches that apply the principle of
egalitarianism include lottery and first-come, first-served
[15]. Finally, prioritarianism involves giving priority to the
worst-off, for example those who are already disadvan-
taged, or have the greater clinical need [16].
Another ethical way of thinking about justice in the
contractarian tradition is to employ a “veil of ignorance”
[17]. This involves choosing a principle or procedure
while imagining you might be one of the potential
people in need, without knowing your own position.
The majority of existing literature focuses on the
ethical principles that ought to govern resource alloca-
tion decisions in the NICU, while empirical evidence
provides insight into what factors actually govern the
decision-making process as well as the views of stake-
holders in the NICU. Most empirical studies in this area
focus on the views of healthcare practitioners [18, 19],
particularly neonatologists [19, 20], and parents [21, 22].
We sought to explore the views of lay people (non-
health professionals) about resource allocation decisions
in the NICU using a series of hypothetical rationing
dilemmas designed to test egalitarian or utilitarian intui-
tions. The views of the general public do not resolve
ethical questions, but are relevant in realising the goals
of democratic legitimacy and may play a role in the
process of reflective equilibrium [23]. Our aim was to
examine general intuitions and compare them with
theoretical models. We focused on resource allocation in
newborn infants because of our clinical interest in
newborn intensive care, but also because it allowed us to
set aside differences in clinical need as well as the ques-
tion of age in allocation [24]. We hypothesized that
respondents would be inclined to give treatment prefer-
ence to infants with a better predicted outcome, and that
ethical inclinations may be associated with demographic
characteristics, personality traits and political views.
Methods
Members of the general public were recruited via an on-
line survey platform (Mechanical Turk, Amazon, Seattle
WA). The survey population platform has a stable and
diverse pool of participants spanning a wide range of
age, socio-economic and ethnic backgrounds [25]. Re-
spondents were remunerated $1 for participation. Only
those with a pre-existing survey approval rate of 95 % or
above on greater than 100 tasks could participate.
Demographic questions assessed respondent age,
gender, parental status, marital status, highest level of
education, country of residence and religiosity.
The questionnaire consisted of 20 hypothetical ration-
ing scenarios. Scenarios were piloted with a group of
university students with non-medical backgrounds to
test comprehensibility and clarity. SurveyMonkey
(www.surveymonkey.com/) was used for survey design
and data collection.
Respondents were first asked to indicate their willing-
ness to provide treatment for infants with different prog-
noses in a setting without any limit in bed capacity or
resources (Likert scale: strongly disagree - strongly agree,
1–6). They were then required to consider a situation of
scarcity with only one intensive care bed available and
choose one of two critically ill newborn infants to admit
for life-saving treatment. Respondents were informed
that an infant not admitted would likely die. Infants var-
ied to different degrees in either chance of survival,
severity of predicted disability, life expectancy, or cost of
treatment (Additional file 1: Questionnaire), as shown in
Fig. 1a. Where cost varied between infants, an explicit
fixed budget was specified, and less expensive treatments
were described as leading to more lives saved (Fig. 1b).
Available options were to A) admit the infant with the
better outcome, B) admit the infant with the worse out-
come, or C) toss a coin to decide. For analysis, Option A
was classified as a utilitarian response, while Option C
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was classified an egalitarian response. Option B was
designated N/A, as it did not correlate with any particu-
lar principle of allocation. The order of options varied
randomly between questions.
Two scenarios were repeated in a version designed to
emulate a hypothetical ‘veil of ignorance’ (Additional file
1), with choices potentially affecting one of their own fu-
ture children [26]. Respondents were required to choose
between a policy that would respond to situations of
scarcity in the NICU either by admitting children with
better-predicted outcome, or by tossing a coin to decide.
They were asked to imagine that they would in the
future have a newborn infant in need of intensive care,
without knowing whether their child has the better or
worse prognosis.
In order to examine the influence of underlying person-
ality traits and political views on resource allocation pref-
erences, three validated scales were also included: the
Need for Cognition scale (a measure of tendency to enjoy
effortful cognitive endeavours) [27], Empathic Concern
index (a quantitative measure of empathy) [28], and the
Social and Economic Conservatism scale (a measure of
political ideology) [29].
A final question gauged response to a frequently cited
philosophical thought experiment involving a choice
between sending a lifeboat to rescue a sinking vessel
containing one passenger, or one containing five
passengers [30].
For sample size, we calculated that a sample of 85
would have a power of 80 % to detect a 20 % shift from
egalitarian to utilitarian views and minimal-to-no switch
between other response categories (p = 0.05) [29]. We
assumed a 20 % rate of incomplete responses, and hence
aimed for a total sample of 100–110 participants.
Data organisation, recoding and analysis were performed
using SPSS Statistics version 22.0 software. In order to
Fig. 1 Hypothetical rationing scenarios in the setting of scarce neonatal intensive care resources. a. Example question with varying chance of
survival. b. Example question with varying cost of treatment
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examine associations between utilitarian or egalitarian re-
sponses and demographic and personality factors, we ex-
amined a subset of scenarios with the most divergent
responses (“Key indicator questions”: 40 % vs. 51 % chance
of survival, none vs. mild disability, 40 vs. 41 years life ex-
pectancy, and treating 1 vs. 2 newborn infants). Likert re-
sponses were classified into three groups (strongly/
moderately disagree, mildly disagree or mildly agree,
strongly/moderately agree). Responses to scenarios involv-
ing allocation of limited resources were analysed using a
2x3 McNemar-Bowker Test for symmetry of responses on
pairs of questions [31, 32, 34]. The McNemar-Bowker test
of symmetry is used with matched pair, nominal data (with
more than two categories) to assess whether changes in re-
sponses are significantly different. Unlike the chi-square
test, the McNemar-Bowker test does not assume that ob-
servations are independent. It therefore accounts for the
repeated measures nature of the survey design.
We calculated Cramer’s V, which provided a measure
of the strength of association between paired responses.
The lower the value of V, the more responses vary
between a pair of questions. We used a cut-off value of
V < 0.5 indicating that responses are at most moderately
associated, and that there was a statistically larger differ-
ence in response to paired questions.
Independent samples t tests were conducted to
compare the mean personality scores of utilitarian and
egalitarian respondents and their responses to key
indicator questions. Finally, Fisher’s exact test was used
to find any association between demographic character-
istics and allocation preferences. The null hypothesis
was rejected at p < 0.05.
The University of Oxford Central University Research
Ethics Committee and the Monash University Human
Research Ethics Committee approved the study. Partici-
pation was voluntary, anonymous and limited to those
18 years or over.
Results
One hundred and nine respondents completed the ques-
tionnaire. The demographic characteristics of respon-
dents are summarized in Table 1. The mean age of
respondents was 40 years. Respondents were predomin-
antly female (61.5 %), 50 % had a tertiary education, and
56 % were religious. The majority (87 %) was from the
US.
Willingness to admit patients in the absence of scarcity
In the absence of scarcity, the majority of respondents
indicated a willingness to provide treatment for infants
in all scenarios, except in the setting of severe disability
(42.7 % strongly or moderately agreed to admit the
infant to intensive care) or highly expensive treatment
($7,000,000 cost, 49.6 % strongly or moderately agreed
to admit), as shown in Table 2. Respondents expressed a
stronger inclination to admit patients with a better prog-
nosis. The higher the chance of survival, the more will-
ing respondents were to admit the patient (F(1.2, 129.9)
= 57.37, p <0.000). Similarly, respondents were more
willing to admit patients with less severe future disability
Table 1 Demographic characteristics of respondents, N = 109
Age Mean ± SD, range 40.1 ± 11.6,
23.0–69.0
Sex Male 42 (38.5 %)
Female 67 (61.5 %)
Parental status Parent 64 (58.7 %)
Non-parent 45 (41.3 %)
Marital status Single 55 (50.5 %)
Married/De Facto 54 (49.5 %)
Highest level of education Primary 3 (2.8 %)
Secondary 52 (47.7 %)
Tertiary 54 (49.5 %)
Religiosity Non-religious (scores 1–3) 49 (41.1 %)
Scale of 1–7: 1 = strongly
disagree, 7 = strongly agree
Neutral (score of 4) 8 (6.7 %)
Religious (scores 5–7) 52 (43.8 %)
Country of origin United States (US) 95 (87.2 %)
Non-US 14 (12.8 %)
Table 2 Willingness to admit patients based on prognostic









2A. Chance of survival
10 % 8.1 % 26.8 % 65.2 %
20 % 5.1 % 30.3 % 64.3 %
60 % 0.0 % 5.4 % 94.6 %
70 % 0.0 % 1.8 % 98.3 %
2B. Severity of future disability
Mild 1.8 % 12.7 % 85.4 %
Moderate 4.5 % 32.7 % 62.7 %
Severe 20.0 % 37.3 % 42.7 %
2C. Life expectancy
5 years 12.8 % 27.3 % 60.0 %
15 years 3.6 % 24.5 % 71.9 %
25 years 1.8 % 13.6 % 84.6 %
2D. Cost of treatment
$5,000 USD 0.0 % 4.6 % 95.4 %
$10,000 USD 0.0 % 7.3 % 92.7 %
$150,000 USD 3.7 % 15.6 % 80.7 %
$200,000 USD 7.4 % 15.6 % 77.1 %
$7,000,000 USD 18.4 % 32.1 % 49.6 %
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(F(1.5, 159.5) = 67.67, p < 0.000), longer life expectancy
(F(1.3, 138.1) = 41.65, p < 0.000) or less expensive treat-
ment (F(1.9, 200.3) = 63.16, p < 0.000).
Limited resources and allocation
When forced to choose between patients because of
limited resources, the majority of respondents chose to
direct treatment to the infant with the better predicted
outcome or lower cost of treatment (Fig. 2). The only
exception was a scenario in which one infant was pre-
dicted to survive for 40 years, while the second was
predicted to survive for 41 years. Two thirds of respon-
dents elected to toss a coin to decide between the two
infants in that scenario.
There was a significantly higher rate of utilitarian
responses in scenarios with greater difference in pre-
dicted chance of survival, predicted duration of survival,
or cost of treatment (Figure 2a, c and d). For example,
in relation to predicted chance of survival, there was a
significant asymmetry in responses to questions 10 and
9 (Q10 49 vs. 51 %, Q9 10 vs. 20 %, X2 = 24.154, P < 0.000,
Cramer’s V = 0.406) and questions 9 and 7 (Q9 10 % vs.
20 %, Q7 20 % vs. 60 %, X2 = 25.000, P < 0.000, Cramer’s
V = 0.424). There was also asymmetric distribution of
responses for questions related to duration of survival
(Fig. 2c) and cost of treatment (Fig. 2d). There were,
however, no significant differences in the proportion of
utilitarian responses between different degrees of disability
(Fig. 2b).
There was no statistically significant difference
between responses to questions in standard format and
veil of ignorance versions (Table 3).
In the lifeboat question, 98 % of respondents (88/90)
elected to save five drowning people rather than one
person: only 2 % elected to toss a coin to decide.
Personality traits did not appear to influence
responses. There was no significant difference between
the Empathic Concern scores of those who gave utilitar-
ian responses and those who gave egalitarian responses
to key indicator questions. There was also no significant
Fig. 2 Responses to trade-off questions comparing infants with different prognostic variables: a chance of survival, b severity of predicted
disability, c life expectancy, d cost of treatment
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difference between Need for Cognition scores or Social
Economic Conservatism scale scores for utilitarian and
egalitarian respondents.
Utilitarian responses to scenarios involving scarcity
(i.e. where only one intensive care bed was available)
were correlated with responses to questions in the
absence of scarcity. The greater a respondent’s utilitarian
propensity, the greater the effect of cost of treatment
(F(29.5, 183.2) = 1.56, p < 0.05), chance of survival
(F(18.1, 112.4) = 1.88, p < 0.05) and life expectancy
(F(20.2, 125.0) = 1.73, p < 0.05) on inclination to admit
the patient (in the non-scarce scenarios). Conversely, the
willingness of respondents who were less utilitarian to
admit patients remained similar regardless of prognostic
information.
Some demographic characteristics influenced responses.
Female respondents were significantly more inclined than
male respondents to choose the egalitarian option of tos-
sing a coin to determine which patient to admit when the
trade-off was between a newborn infant with a mild dis-
ability and a newborn infant with no disability (p < 0.01).
Parents were significantly more likely than non-parents to
give an egalitarian response when asked to choose
between treating one newborn infant or two (p = 0.01).
Religious respondents were significantly more inclined to
choose the utilitarian option of admitting a newborn
infant with a 51 % chance of survival, over an infant with
a 49 % chance (p = 0.02). Age, marital status, highest level
of education, and country of origin had no significant
association with allocation preferences.
Discussion
This study examined the responses of a sample of the
general public to a series of rationing dilemmas in new-
born intensive care. When asked to choose between crit-
ically ill infants, the majority of respondents, in all but
one scenario, sought the greatest benefit of treatment
(i.e. chose the utilitarian option). This cross section of
the lay public was remarkably utilitarian. Respondents
were more likely to give utilitarian responses where
there was a larger difference in predicted outcome be-
tween critically ill patients. Personality traits and polit-
ical preferences were not associated with responses to
rationing dilemmas.
Respondents in our survey consistently gave priority
for treatment to patients with higher chance of survival,
greater life expectancy, lower severity of disability and
lower cost of treatment. Only in a scenario with a small
(one year) difference in life expectancy did the majority
of respondents choose to toss a coin to decide which
patient to admit.
Implications for ethical debate
Empirical findings like these cannot be used deductively
to yield normative conclusions [33]. However, they may
contribute to a dynamic process of reflective equilibrium
[23]. Our study results provide valuable data on the rela-
tionship between the intuitions of the general public and
ethical arguments.
The strikingly utilitarian tendency of the general pub-
lic in this study is consistent with previous studies on
healthcare practitioner resource allocation preferences
[16, 18, 19, 22], however, contrasts with previous studies
of the general public, which have indicated a preference
for a more egalitarian approach [35–38].
One difference between this and previous rationing
surveys is the requirement for respondents to choose be-
tween two individual patients in need of life-saving treat-
ment, rather than choosing between two groups of
patients, or different types of treatment. For example, in
a survey conducted in Norway and repeated in the US,
participants were asked to distribute an increase in
health funding between the treatment of two illnesses of
different severity [36, 38]. Participants gave priority to
patients with more severe illness, even if they would
benefit less from treatment. Life-or-death rationing at
the cot-side in intensive care may appear closer to an
emergency triage situation than prioritizing funding or
health policy decisions [39]. It may be that utilitarian
intuitions are stronger where the outcome for individual
patients is more explicit.
One significant factor influencing NICU resource allo-
cation decisions in our survey was the degree of differ-
ence between predicted outcomes in competing patients.
This finding was consistent with a previous survey by
Ubel et al., which investigated whether the public priori-
tizes equity or efficiency in distributing scarce organs to
children needing a liver transplant [40]. That study
found that respondents were less likely to give patients
an equal opportunity for receiving treatment where
there was a larger difference in prognosis between trans-
plant candidates [35]. In our study, the same trend was
seen in relation to three of the variables investigated. In
Table 3 Responses to standard format and veil of ignorance
questions relating to two prognostic variables
Severity of disability: moderate vs. severe
Standard format Veil of ignorance format
Utilitarian 80 % Utilitarian 77 %
Egalitarian 16 % Egalitarian 18 %
N/A 5 % N/A 5 %
Chance of survival: 20 vs. 60 % chance
Standard format Veil of ignorance format
Utilitarian 93 % Utilitarian 89 %
Egalitarian 4 % Egalitarian 7 %
N/A 4 % N/A 4 %
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a choice between infants with a 49 and 51 % chance of sur-
vival, a bare majority of respondents (52.7 %) chose the
utilitarian option of treating the newborn infant with a
higher chance of survival. In contrast, where there was a
10 % difference in chance of survival, three quarters of re-
spondents elected to admit the infant with better prognosis.
Our study did not investigate the reasons why partici-
pants gave different responses. The largest number of
egalitarian responses were seen when the discrepancy be-
tween outcomes was small; perhaps the difference in life-
span was considered by respondents to have negligible
normative value. Alternatively, it may be that respondents
were skeptical about the ability of clinicians to accurately
predict the length of survival in adult life. Uncertainty
about predictions might support a more egalitarian ap-
proach [41]. Finally, our results could be consistent with
an ethical approach that balances a number of different
ethical principles including equality and utility [40, 42].
Equality might be thought to outweigh small gains in util-
ity, and lead to a different response in marginal cases.
Interestingly, three of the prognostic factors (in the ab-
sence of scarcity) showed a significant interaction with
respondents’ utilitarian propensity to scenarios where
resources were limited. The exception was for informa-
tion about severity of future disability, which suggests
that such information may affect a respondents’ inclin-
ation to admit regardless of utilitarian propensity.
Implications for ethical theory
The results of this paper may also be of value for ethical
theory. We gave our respondents a version of a much-
discussed philosophical example, where they must
choose between sending a lifeboat to save five people or
one person [30]. Egalitarian philosophers have claimed
that in such a situation we ought to toss a coin to decide
(though acknowledge that this is counterintuitive) [30].
However, to our knowledge, the views of the general
public about this have never been elicited. The over-
whelming majority of respondents in our survey chose
to send the lifeboat to save the larger number.
Political philosopher John Rawls famously described a
procedure for developing fair and just public policy [26].
He imagined a group of hypothetical rational decision-
makers who would have to decide how society should be
structured without knowing their place in that society –
whether they would be rich or poor, healthy or unhealthy,
and so on. Rawls’ ‘veil of ignorance’ is designed to over-
come prejudice or bias and is often thought to favour
those who are worst off. Although Rawls did not apply this
decision-making procedure to health care resource alloca-
tion, philosophers have taken different views about the
sort of allocation policy that would be chosen behind the
veil. For example, Singer et al. propose that in a scenario
where two people need a life-saving treatment, but only
one can receive it, a rational egoist would assume they
have equal chance of being either person, and that they
would maximize their own chances by directing treatment
to the patient with better prognosis [43]. In contrast, Har-
ris suggests that decision-makers behind the veil are likely
to be risk-averse and would focus on reducing the chance
for the individual at the time of allocation of the worst
outcome (death) [44]. Harris argues that this would be ac-
complished by an egalitarian approach of random alloca-
tion (for example, tossing a coin) [44].
There have been few empirical studies of the impact of
the veil of ignorance on public views about resource
allocation [45]. We asked our respondents to imagine
making policy about resource allocation in intensive care
that would affect their own children (but without
knowing their child’s prognosis). Respondents were
predominantly utilitarian in their responses behind the
veil. This appears to support Singer et al’s predictions
[43]. 89.3 and 77.3 % of respondents chose the infant
with a greater chance of survival and infant with a less
severe disability, respectively. There were no statistically
significant differences between responses to the policy
questions and their equivalent versions without the veil.
This finding does not resolve the debate between
utilitarianism and egalitarianism, but does imply that the
veil of ignorance thought experiment would favour the
former (at least in situations where patients would be
equally badly off without treatment).
Demographic characteristics
There were some associations between demographic char-
acteristics and responses to the survey. Parents were more
egalitarian than non-parents in allocating resources based
on cost of treatment. This is consistent with a survey of
mothers of NICU infants from South Africa, in which the
majority rejected rationing of resources entirely [22].
Females were more inclined to be egalitarian than males
in relation to allocation of resources based on severity of
disability. Religiosity influenced resource allocation prefer-
ence based on chance of survival. Interestingly, respon-
dents who described themselves as religious were more
likely to give a utilitarian response than non-religious
people. This finding is in contrast with previous studies,
where a high proportion of people who chose egalitarian
allocation were religious [46].
There was no relationship between age, marital status,
or highest level of education and resource allocation
preference. In a previous Australian study of the general
public’s resource allocation preferences, all of these three
factors were seen to influence treatment decisions [47].
Personality tests
The mean scores of respondents on the Empathic Con-
cern portion of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index, the
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Need for Cognition scale and the 12-item Social and
Economic Conservatism Scale (SECS), had no relation-
ship with their resource allocation inclinations. This
might reflect that resource allocation preferences are not
influenced by level of empathy or a greater level of deep
thinking, but rather depend upon context-dependent
moral evaluations.
Strengths and limitations
This study is distinctive in assessing the views of a sam-
ple of the general public, rather than healthcare practi-
tioners on resource allocation in the NICU. It provides
valuable comparative data on responses to philosophical
examples that have been widely discussed, but not previ-
ously studied empirically. The results of the survey
should be taken cautiously, however. Our small online
sample may not be representative of the wider general
public. Mechanical Turk samples have been shown to be
more diverse than convenience samples of students or
the adult population, but less representative than face-
to-face population sampling [47].
We were not able to determine why respondents chose
particular answers, and responses may reflect uncritical
initial responses that might change with further time to
consider, or might be sensitive to the way in which cases
were presented. Our scenarios specified equal starting
points and equal clinical need for infants needing inten-
sive care, therefore did not test prioritarian intuitions. Fur-
thermore, in order to isolate factors that influenced
decisions, scenarios were necessarily somewhat unrealistic
and compared single variables sequentially. It is possible
that a larger sample and factorial survey design would
have allowed analysis of the interaction between variables
in more complex real-world allocation scenarios [48].
Conclusion
In this study, when faced with hypothetical difficult
choices between critically ill neonates, respondents were
strikingly utilitarian in their resource allocation
preferences.
We focused on newborn infants; however, the princi-
ples that apply to rationing in newborn intensive care
would also potentially apply in paediatric or adult inten-
sive care. Future research should explore responses to
rationing dilemmas in older children, adults and other
populations. It would be helpful to compare prioritarian
with utilitarian intuitions in rationing dilemmas. It
would also be helpful to further clarify the decision-
making rationale of the general public by using a quali-
tative methodology that would assess the reasons behind
judgements, to use a factorial survey design that would
permit analysis of the influence and interaction of differ-
ent factors, and to assess whether the way in which cases
are presented influences responses.
Although the findings of this study should not in
themselves determine the practice of healthcare practi-
tioners or the development of micro-allocation policy in
the NICU, they can contribute to fruitful discussion in
this area. In practice, clinicians should provide the best
treatment that they can to newborn infants within avail-
able resources. Where possible, this will mean avoiding
the sort of stark choices described in this paper through
redistributing available resources, arranging transport of
patients to other centres, or advocating for greater
resources. However, difficult decisions will sometimes
remain, especially in resource-limited settings. The
apparently utilitarian inclination of respondents may in-
dicate that the general public would support a policy for
resource allocation in the NICU that directs clinicians to
preferentially treat patients with better prognosis. Where
there are small differences in predicted outcome
between patients competing for life-saving treatment, it
may be important to give them equal chances for receiv-
ing treatment [41].
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